Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 12
Number 1 Fall

Article 3

January 1982

The Ultimate Nightmare: What If Terrorists Go Nuclear
Robert A. Friedlander

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Robert A. Friedlander, The Ultimate Nightmare: What If Terrorists Go Nuclear, 12 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1
(1982).

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

FACULTY COMMENT

The Ultimate Nightmare:
What If Terrorists Go Nuclear?
ROBERT

A. FRIEDLANDER*

The sudden Israeli air attack upon the Baghdad Osirak nuclear reactor in June 1981 served to dramatize, more than any other event since the
first thermonuclear bomb explosions, the dangers inherent in an international nuclear arms race and the possible global consequences of nuclear
proliferation.'
Burgeoning European opposition to nuclear armament last summer
swelled into a mass of demonstrations by October 1981.' Four prominent
American political and intellectual figures created a mild sensation in the
spring of 1982, advocating a last resort approach to nuclear weapons
while simultaneously arguing for their prevention and against their utilization. 3 During the same time, a growing anti-nuclear movement in the
United States reached immense proportions,' and a national best-seller,
brooding about the nuclear extinction of humankind, continues to engender intense and bitter debate over the use of nuclear weaponry.'
01982 by Robert A. Friedlander
*Robert A. Friedlander is a professor at the Pettit College of Law at Ohio Northern
University and a member of the Board of Advisors of the Denver Journal of International
Law and Policy.
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NAvAL WAR C. Rav. 33 (Mar.-Apr. 1982).
2. Laqueur, Hollanditis:A New Stage in European Neutralism, in COMMENTARY, Aug.
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3. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara & Smith, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,
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June 13, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
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A "doomsday" simulation exercise carried out by high U.S. Government officials was declared a success in March 1982, despite its ominous
results. 6 The lead article in the first issue of the 1982 Naval War College
Review examines the possibility of naval nuclear warfare and concludes
that "our putative enemy leaves us no choice but to think about, plan for,
and develop a capability to fight a tactical nuclear war at sea." As the
British-Argentinian conflict grew in intensity, the president of Argentina's Atomic Energy Commission expressed fear that Great Britain
would resort to tactical nuclear weapons to resolve the Falkland Islands
crisis, notwithstanding the fact that Argentina is generally suspected of
trying to achieve a similar nuclear capability.8
None of these developments gives any indication of the increasing
concern among scientists, political analysts, and Western security agencies as to the means most likely to unleash what President Ronald Reagan has termed "the ultimate nightmare." A number of popular novels
written by well-informed authors in both Great Britain and the United
States have dramatically demonstrated the possibility, if not the
probability, of nuclear terrorism initiated by terrorist governments, terror
organizations, and crazed or corrupt physicists. 10 Pope John Paul II's prophetic warning to the world community about "the dark fascination of
violence and warfare," delivered shortly before his departure for Portugal"1 and the second attempt on his life,12 applies equally to nation-states
and non-state actors. The recent statement by Richard Perle, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, is much more specific and much more ominous: "I can imagine a situation where a nuclear
weapon was in the hands of a terrorist, in which case you might want to
evacuate a city . .

.

s

The Bologna railway station bombing," the Munich Oktoberfest
Kennan, On Nuclear War, id., at 8-12; Krauthammer, In Defense of Deterrence: How To
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9. Cable News Network, Evening News, May 9, 1982.
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bombing,18 and the Rue Copernic bombing in Paris's have demonstrated
clearly and convincingly that terrorists of both the left and the right are
now willing to escalate the threshold of violence to levels previously believed to be unattainable because of alleged terrorist concern over possible public outrage. Two events which occurred during the first several
months of 1982, although serious but not catastrophic, nevertheless may
be harbingers of a more lethal future for the international social order.
On January 18, 1982, five rockets were fired from across the Rhone River
into the concrete walls surrounding the French Creys-Malville nuclear facility. Fortunately only minor damage resulted. An organization calling
itself the Pacifist and Ecological Committee took credit for the attack. 7
On May 5, 1982, Spanish ETA terrorists machine-gunned the director of"
a Basque nuclear plant located at Lemoniz, in an attempt to prevent the
$2 billion dollar, 930 megawatt reactor, from becoming operational."'
In the eleven years from 1966 to 1977, there were ten serious incidents of theft and violence directed against European nuclear installations.19 During April 1979, a French nuclear reactor at La Seyne-sur-Mer
suffered $20 million damage and was sixty percent destroyed by a terrorist attack by an organization which identified itself as the Group of
French Nature Protectors. 0 Between 1969 and 1975, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administration reported 288 threats of violence or actual incidents relating to nuclear facilities or offices. This included 240 bomb threats and fourteen
bombings and attempted bombings."1
Robert Kupperman, former chief scientist of the U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, warns that terrorists are raising their technological competence to highly sophisticated levels. Moreover, "physicists,
chemists, engineers and biologists are joining their ranks ... . ' With
respect to nuclear terrorism in any conceivable form, the real issue is not
one of possibility, but merely one of credibility. "That terrorists may not
behave differently from states""8 is one expert's motivational explanation
15. NEwswFEK, Oct. 13, 1980, at 71.
16. THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 25, 1980, at 41-42; The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Oct. 4,
1980, at 5-A, col. 4.
17. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), Jan. 19, 1982, at 1, col 1.
18. Id., May 6, 1982, at 6, col. 6.

19. Lz Nouvs

OBsERvATEuR,

Apr. 14, 1979, at 44.

20. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), Mar. 15, 1980, at 4, col. 4. The German magazine, Stern.
later claimed that this attack was the work of the Israeli Mossad, seeking to prevent a nuclear technology transfer to Iraq. Id. The English version of the Mar. 13 & 20, 1980 Stern
articles are reprinted in Follath, Israel's Elite Intelligence Corps, WORLD PwasS Rzv. May
1980, at 29-31. See also The Miami Herald, Apr. 15, 1979, at 4-A, col. 1.
21. L. BzIngs, APoCALYPsE NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE iN WORLD PoLrics 182-83 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as

APOCALYPSE].

22. Glasser, SophisticatedArms Reflect New Dangers of Terrorism, The Miami Herald, Apr. 3, 1980, at 10-D, col. 1.
23. Jenkins, The Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL POLrCAL EFFECTS OF THE SPREAD OF NucLEAR WEAPONS 85 (J. King ed. 1979).
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for the threat of a quantitative leap in terrorist technology. According to
Rand Corporation analyst Brian Jenkins:
[TJerrorists emulate states. If a nuclear device becomes a widely
perceived symbol of state power, terrorists may be more inclined to go
domain-for exnuclear, or at least to carry out actions in a nuclear
4
ample, attacking or seizing nuclear reactors.2
More than 15 years ago an ad hoc Panel on Safeguarding Nuclear
Material reported to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission that safeguards
were needed for the protection and security of nuclear materials, and that
the present programs were largely inadequate to meet these ends.25 Particular concern was manifested over potential criminal diversion of materiel, misuse of explosives, the aiding and abetting of foreign governments
through shipment of illicit supplies, arranging the transfer of nuclear substances into the hands of unauthorized parties, and the potential construction of a nuclear weapon .2 Several years later, two distinguished
scholars, one a physicist and the other a law professor, published a detailed study of how and why an incident of nuclear terrorism could occur,
warning that "[s]cenarios of nuclear hijackings or bomb threats might become self-fulfilling prophecies.' '1 7 The few voices originally raised over
fear of a nuclear terrorist incident in the late 1960's and early 1970's have
been slowly swelling into a chorus of despair."8
British security agencies now frankly admit that a potential terrorist
nuclear incident is undeniably credible, and that the basic question relating to the nuclear threat isno longer if, but when an episode of mass
destruction will occur.' 9 The truth of the matter is that catastrophe theory cannot permit a single miscalculation when governments are required
to think the unthinkable. "The world is pregnant with apocalyptic
possibilities."' 0
The nature of these possibilities is the concern of a recent doomsday
analysis by political scientist Louis Ren6 Beres."' He envisions three
roads to Armageddon: (1) nuclear war between superpowers; (2) nuclear

24. Id.

25. Report to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Ad Hoc Panel on Safeguarding
Special Nuclear Material, Mar. 10, 1967 reprinted in 2 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DocuMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOcAL CONTROL 431-57 (1979).
26. Id. at 436, 444, 452-54.
27. M. WI.LRCH & T. TAYLOR, NucsKAR THmr. RISKS AND SAFEGuARIs 2 (1974); See
also J. McPHE=, THE CURvE OF BINDING ENERGY 1-4, 87-100, 143-51 (1974).
28. L. BERES, TERiOsmM AND GLOBAL SzcuRITY: THE NucLEAR THREAT 15-52 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as TERROmSM]; R. CLARK, TECHNOLOGICAL TERRORISM 7-103 (1980);
Greenwood, Non-State Entities, in T. GREENWOOD, H. FEIVESON, & T. TAYLOR, NucLEAR
PROLIFERATION: MOTIVATIONS, CAPABIXTZS, AND STRATEGIES FOR CONTROL 99-107 (1977); R.
KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, TERRORISM: THREAT, REALITY, RESPONSE 58-62, 104-05 (1979);
Flood, Nuclear Sabotage, The Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1977, at C1, col. 1 & C4, col. 1.
29. Private information discussed with the author, London, Feb. 20, 1980.
30. T RRORSM, supra note 28, at 45.
31. APOcALYPSE, note 21 supra.
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war resulting from proliferation; and (3) a nuclear holocaust initiated by
8 2
terror-violence.
As a corollary, Beres adds a further category-"the use of nuclear
technology in a civil war."8 8 Although seriously concerned over the first
two classifications, his ultimate fear is that nuclear terrorism is both credible and practicable, either by means of nuclear explosives, radiological
weapons, or sabotage of nuclear reactors."
Some experts who previously had been skeptical of terrorist nuclear
threats, such as Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, 5 have shifted
their position toward acceptance of those potential dangers. By the beginning of the current decade, Jenkins was conceding that terrorism "has a
built-in requirement for escalation, if not bloodshed, at least in audacity,
drama, or magnitude of the threat." 86 Social scientist Thomas Schelling
warns: "[slome time in the 1980's an organization that is not a national
government may acquire a few nuclear weapons.' 7 If this is so, then the
question of who and how become quintessential issues.
In developing his chamber-of-horrors hypotheticals, Beres has listed
some factors giving credence to these grim prophecies:
(1) Ease of access "to nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities."
(2) Ready "availability of weapons resources."
(3) Terrorist willingness for self-sacrifice "renders them insensitive to
ordinary threats of retaliation."
(4) Cooperation and collaboration among terrorist groups has been
amply documented.
(5) A tolerant attitude within the world community toward terrorism
and terrorists has substantially vitiated "the enactment of effective
counter-measures."' u
Terrorism is the theater of the unexpected. Although there have been
many unhappy surprises played out on the global stage during the "Terror Decade" of the 1970's and the "Dangerous Decade" of the 1980's,
nothing will be more cataclysmic in terms of shock value than an actual
terrorist nuclear incident.
There are some critics who argue that since we still lack adequate
"knowledge of terrorist motivations," conclusions about possible terrorist
intentions "would be counter-productive."' 9 Although Beres is likewise

32. Id. at 17-116.
33. Id. at 14.

34. Id. at 175.
35. See Brown, Nuclear Facilities and Materials in LEGAL AsPzcTs or INTERNATIONAL
156 (A. Evans & J. Murphy eds. 1978).
36. Quoted in Glasser, note 22 supra. See also Jenkins, supra note 23, at 89-91.
37. Schelling, Thinking About Nuclear Terrorism, 6 INT'L SEcURTY 61 (1982).
38. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 14-15.
39. Crenshaw, The Prospect of CatastrophicTerrorism, 8 Aim=D FORCES AND SOcIETy
156-57 (1981). This claim is,
however, misleading at best. See, for example, R. FIRDLANDEz,
TERORIsM

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 12:1

reticent to suggest the existence of a "terrorist mind," and instead postulates "a potpourri of ideas, visions, methods, and objectives" on the part
of terrorist actors,4" he does roughly identify specific types of terrorist
groups: guerilla, criminal, secessionist, and ideological." But he avoids
the kind of typology and taxonomy that are delineated in his previous
study.4 2
Warning is one thing; prevention is something else. Beres correctly
points out that possible remedies provided by the international legal system have not kept pace with the political convolutions of the world community. "In certain instances, the split sympathies of states on the question of terrorism have impaired extant norms.

'4 3

On the one hand, he

urges sanctions applied to those states "which sponsor or support terrorist groups and activities."44 But although he advocates state compliance
with the basic instruments governing the international protection of
human rights, 45 he does not advocate the last resort, a counterforce response.46 Yet at times, force must be met with force, and terrorist groups
or their state protectors must be subject to retribution which will prevent
further killing. There are occasions when those who live by the sword
47
must be made to realize that they will also die by the sword.
In his earlier and at times eloquent assessment, entitled Terrorism
and Global Security, Beres takes a pessimistic view of the terrorist actor's willingness to limit the upward spiral of terrorist harm. Since perpetrators of terror-violence have shown themselves to be insensitive to those
constraints which are the traditional means of maintaining order among
nation-states, "threats of deterrence might have little or no bearing on
the terrorist decision concerning the use of nuclear force.' ' If this is true,
then the issues become: 1) what can the nuclear terrorist do; and 2) how
easily can it be done?
The staff director of the U.S. National Advisory Committee Task
TERRORISM: DocuMENTs OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 49-70 (1979); F. HACKER,
CRUSADERS, CRIMINALS, CRAzms: TEROR AND TERRORISM IN OuR TiME 3-101 (1976); Cooper,

The Terrorist and the Victim, 1 VxcrMoLoGy: AN INT'L J. 229 (1976); Horwitz, Political
Terrorism and State Power, 1 J. PoL. & MiL. Soc. 147, 148-50 (1973); Russel & Miller,
Profile of a Terrorist, 1 TERRORIsM: AN INT'L J. 17 (1977).
40. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 250-51.
41. Id. at 251-56.
42. TERRoRsM, supra note 28.
43. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 117. See also, Friedlander, Terrorism and International Law: What Is Being Done, 8 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 383 (1977).
44. APOCALYPSE, supra note 21, at 260.

45. Id. at 262-63.
46. Id. at 117-18.

47. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has analogized the successful capture of a hijacked Tanzanian airplane at Stansted Airport near London in February 1982 to British

actions in the Falkland Islands crisis. A forcible response, she declared, is the only way "to
really stand up for international law against international anarchy." TIME, May 10, 1982, at
24. See also Green, Rescue at Entebbe: Legal Aspects, 6 ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTS. 312 (1976).
48. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 33.
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Force on Disorders and Terrorism has bluntly asserted that "[ailmost
certainly, some terrorists today have the formal capability to make, deliver, and detonate a nuclear device. 49 Other analysts differ only in degree. Journalist Ovid Demaris concludes his well researched, highly detailed study of international terrorist organizations by boldly stating:
"Nuclear terrorism is the wave of the future."5 0 Even physicist Edward
Teller, the man most responsible for developing the hydrogen bomb, admits that although a terrorist group is unlikely to make its own atomic
weapon, "I don't dare say that something of this kind is absolutely
impossible."51
When a workable atom bomb can be designed by a C minus
Princeton University undergraduate student from readily available scientific information, and when a Pakistani diplomat offers to buy the plans"
(Pakistan need no longer be interested-it is close to having its own
atomic weapon),58 then danger lurks everywhere. Similar independent efforts were successfully carried out by students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.) and Harvard University, the former commissioned by National Educational Television." And one need not build a
bomb in order to develop an explosive nuclear device.5 5 Two M.I.T. physicists have warned that "the destruction of a reactor with a nuclear
weapon, even of relatively small yield, such as a crude terrorist device,
would represent a national catastrophe of lasting consequences." 5 1
Nearly all experts and commentators are agreed that nuclear reactors
constitute the prime terrorist targets of the future.5 7 According to Beres,
49. H.H.A.

COOPER, EVALUATING THE TERRORIST THREAT. PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED RISK

ASSESSMENT 15 (Bureau of Operations and Research, Int'l Ass'n. of Chiefs of Police, 1979).

50. 0.

DEMARIS,

BROTHERS IN BLOOD: THE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK
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(1977).
51. Teller, The Spectre of Nuclear Terrorism, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE-PROCEEDINGS OF THE JERUSALEM CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL TER-

141 (B. Netanyahu ed. 1980).
52. J. PHILLIPS & D. MICHARLIS, MUSHROOM: THE STORY OF THE A-BomE KID (1978).
53. O'Ballance, The Islamic Bomb, in NATIONAL DEFENSE, Dec. 1980, at 52-55; B.

RORISM

RAMBERG, DESTRUCTION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY FACILITIES IN WAR: THE PROBLEM AND THE IM-

PLICATIONS 94, 97 (1980).
54. TERRORISM, supra note

28, at 24-25; R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra note 28, at
58; A. NORTON & M. GREENBERG, UNDERSTANDING THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM PROBLEM 7 (Bureau of Operations and Research, Int'l Ass'n. of Chiefs of Police, 1979). A journalist for the

Progressivemagazine stated that the best source of his story on the hydrogen bomb, which
the U.S. Government tried unsuccessfully to suppress, was the National Atomic Museum at
Kirkland Air Force Base. The Miami Herald, Apr. 15, 1979, at 30-A, col. 1.

55. R.

KUPPERMAN

& D.

TRENT,

supra note 28, at 58-60.

56. Quoted in Schell, Reflections: The Fate of the Earth, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 1,
1982, at 47, 88.
57. APOCALYPSE, supra note 28, at 104-06; 0. DEMARiS, supra note 50, at 417-23; Jen-

kins, supra note 23, at 99; R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra note 28, at 104-05;
M.WILLRICH & T. TAYLOR, supra note 27, at 107-08, 135-52; Ausness, Putting the Genie
Back in the Bottle: U.S. Controls Over Sensitive Nuclear Technology, 16 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON.

65, 82-85 (1981).
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"[tihere have already been at least 94 incidents involving threats of violence or acts of violence to licensed nuclear facilities in this country since
1969."11 If this is not sufficient attraction for various scenarios of terrorist
sabotage, then what can one conjecture about the alleged 2300 operational errors, mechanical failures, and other mishaps which Critical Mass,
an anti-nuclear group, claims occurred during the year 1979?59 In such
circumstances, even if the actual number is reduced by two-thirds, the
potential for theft, sabotage, and mechanistic destruction is not exactly
miniscule.
Rand Corporation expert Brian Jenkins postulates a terrorist team of
three to six individuals, dedicated, probably well-trained, armed with automatic weapons, grenades, and explosives, who would have the capability
of mounting a successful attack upon a U.S. nuclear power plant.60 Recognition of this possibility has led to increased security measures being
taken at U.S. nuclear power stations throughout the country, such as the
Davis-Besse plant in northwest Ohio, which maintains approximately one
hundred trained employees solely for security." Yet, the majority of
plants are still far from secure. A U.S. Government mock combat exercise
held at the end of 1980 at a Southern nuclear facility resulted in the assault team penetrating to the core of the secured installation in only nine
minutes.6 2
Even before the Three Mile Island accident, bomb threats against
that Metropolitan Edison plant were made in September 1972, March
1973, and November 1973.13 Security analyst H.H.A. Cooper writes:
"Most terrorist organizations operate on at least a rough and ready cost/
benefit basis. The value of the operation is assessed in terms of the cost,
tangible and intangible, of attaining the objectives sought.""
In light of the Three Mile Island affair, all kinds of possiblities related to sabotage and nuclear theft have arisen, and the potential for

58. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 28.

59. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), July 14, 1980, at 2, col. 1.
60. Glasser, note 22 supra.
61. The Blade (Toledo, Ohio), May 16, 1982, Sec. B., at 1, col. 1 and Sec. B, at 8, col. 1.
For private American security firms involved in overseas nuclear protection services, see
The Miami Herald, Feb. 16, 1981, at 30F, col. 1.
62. Private information, Washington, D.C., Jan. 22, 1981. See also TERRORISM, supra
note 28, at 28. The ready availability of information useful for such attacks is graphically
described by A. MACLEAN, supra note 10, at 23-24. On September 9, 1982, Sen. John Glenn
(D.-Ohio) declared that serious security problems which exist at federal nuclear weapons
plants may encourage incidents which could paralyze the country and threaten countless
lives. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 10, 1982, at 1-A, col. 5.
63. TERRORISM, supra note 28, at 28.
64. H.H.A. CooPER, supra note 49, at 13. But see Norton, Introduction, in STuDIes IN
NUCLEAR TERRORISM 20 (A. Norton & M. Greenberg eds. 1979) fhereinafter cited as STuIEs], who observes: "[i]t is difficult to conceive of any attainable terrorist objective that
could not be achieved with a more efficient and less costly use of organizational assets than
the nuclear gambit would require."
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damage must be considered enormous. 0 ' Moreover, the discovery that unqualified, unskilled workers have assisted in the construction of nuclear
power plants throughout the United States, including that of Three Mile
Island, raises serious implications about a widespread breach of security
and easy access, via misrepresentation, to these facilities." Diversion of
enriched plutonium from commercial reprocessing centers represents a
further and potentially more serious problem. "The U.S. position has
been that commercial reprocessing plants are difficult to safeguard effectively and, therefore, constitute a serious proliferation risk. ''0 7 Beres,
along with many other experts, advocates hardening the target, 68 although he is not altogether persuaded
by the knee-jerk "search for a
69
mechanical/technological fix."
Any international safeguards, Beres properly argues, must include coercive penalties aimed at those who aid and abet transnational wrongdoers. Thus, global "arrangements for counter-nuclear terrorist cooperation
must include sanctions for states that sponsor or support terrorist groups
and activities. '7 0 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,7 1 signed in October 1979 but not yet entered into force, is a first step in that direction,
but no more than a step. In addition, as Ovid Demaris has caustically
noted, "[t]he IAEA inspection system is totally inadequate against a
country determined to build atomic weapons. 7 2 The IAEA also has no
power over a national system of controls.
Beres's suggestion of a world order approach as the best way to confront the terrorist threat is the weakest aspect of his otherwise excellent
study. 73 It may even be argued in the current state of renewed Cold War
adversity between the United States and the Soviet Union that Thomas
Schelling's proposal of elimination of nuclear weapons is laudable but not

65. Nuclear Accident and Recovery at Three Mile Island: A Special Investigation,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
66. The Plain Dealer (Cleveland, Ohio), May 12, 1982, at 1, col. 1. Illegal purchase of
union cards would, of course, aid the creation of a false identity. On March 31, 1982, after
one year of employment, a quality control inspector of the North Perry Village Nuclear
Power Plant in northeast Ohio was fired because of false credentials. The Blade (Toledo,
Ohio), May 24, 1982, at 6, col. 4.
67. Ausness, supra note 57, at 84.
68. TERRORIsM, supra note 28, at 66-67. See also R. KUPPERMAN & D. TRENT, supra
note 28, at 86-92.
69. TmROmsm, supra note 28, at 65.
70. Id. at 95.
71. Reprinted in 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DocumENTs OF INTERNATiONAL AND LoCAL CONTROL 593-601 (1981).
72. 0. DEMAms, supra note 50, at 411. Certainly, the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, signed in July 1970, has provided almost no significant arms control limitations. For an assessment of the treaty's potentialities and deficiencies, see Comment, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and its Control, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'v 159 (1976).
73. TERRoRISM, supra note 28, at 105-34.
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very practicable.7 4 Nuclear weaponry will continue to proliferate, and the
number of states possessing a nuclear military capacity will continue to
increase if current projections are at all accurate. 75 Small wonder that legalist Benjamin Ferencz pessimistically comments that "[a]s long as sovereign states are not prepared to take the logical steps necessary to re'
strict the use of violence, anarchy will continue. 1"
What are the chances that terrorists can somehow obtain a nuclear
weapon? Former Deputy Secretary of Energy Donald Kerr has indicated
that if a nuclear weapon happened to fall into the hands of a terrorist
group, he could not guarantee that it would not be used. 7 As for terrorists producing a workable nuclear device, an effective design by a
M.I.T. chemistry major in 1975 produced an 800-pound weapon with a
15-pound plutonium core for about $10,000.78 Worse yet, according to the
U.S. Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, unaccounted
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium have disappeared and "[t]ons
7
have been lost." 9
Richard Clark rings the tocsin of impending doom in his fast-paced
study of technological terrorism. His horrifying scenarios are constructed
on a grand scale and serve to warn that if terrorists "can control a nuclear
energy plant, or even a railroad train carrying nuclear wastes, they can
hold whole cities and countries for ransom."80 If that is not enough to
worry about, Clark quotes a Harvard University physicist as saying that
high-powered lasers might also be adapted as a terrorist weapon, in addition to being utilized for a uranium separation into weapons-grade plutonium. 81 Clark is particularly harsh on government bookkeeping controls,
and he is especially critical of the "losses" at the Apollo, Pennsylvania
nuclear facility.8s "Given the materials and about six months time, a
skilled group of five or six people could develop an atomic bomb of crude
,,s3 Radioactive materials alone would be
design that might work ....
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enough to poison the water supply of a major city with disastrous
consequences.
Yet, "[tlo many experts the prospect of biological terrorism is the
most frightening of all."'" Toxic biological and chemical substances can
be manufactured inexpensively, with comparative ease and ready asportation, and can be utilized with deadly effectiveness. The technology for
biological and chemical terrorism already exists, and it is impossible to
defend against them for any successful length of time, let alone to detect
these substances before they are unleashed.8s For those critics, such as
the CIA,8 6 the BDM Corporation,'8 and security expert Robert Mullen,s
who do not believe that nuclear terrorism currently presents a credible
threat, Clark's sometimes breathless treatment of technological terrorism
posits an ominous alternative.
What becomes frighteningly clear, from these studies and others like
them, is that the world community is on a collision course with scientific
catastrophe if stronger means are not developed to contain and control
terrorist actors. To say that all peoples are equally secure in their mutual
insecurity is to avoid the issue. To say that there are some weapons which
no sane or rational individual would ever let loose upon humankind is to
shun reality.
When historian Theodore White writes of "a world of new states led
significantly by madmen and resentful puppets of bizarre historical background,"'" he also indicates the darkening shadows of barbarism drawing
ever closer to the center of civilized nations. Perhaps philosopher JohnPaul Sartre in his play, The Condemned of Altona, discerned the real
monster at the gates: "The [twentieth] century would have been good if
only man hadn't been watched over by his cruel, timeless enemy, the carnivorous species which had sworn to destroy him, the hairless evil animal,
"90
man ....
We have already seen a vision of the demon which would destroy
us-it comes from within ourselves.
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